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37 52.803N 74 46.079W

The Marine Electric began its life as a T2 tanker, constructed
for the United States Merchant Marine. The ship was originally named the
SS Musgrove Mills and was built in May of 1944 by Sun Shipbuilding and
Drydock Company. She was built as hull number 437 and USMC number 1770.
In 1947, she was sold and became the SS Gulfmills. A new mid-section for
cargo transport was added in November 1962 in a West German shipyard,
at which time she was renamed the Marine Electric.

She was
subsequently purchased and managed by Marine Transport Lines (MTL), a
well-respected operator of ships.The Marine Electric put to sea for her
final voyage on February 10, sailing from Norfolk, Virginia to Somerset,
Massachusetts with a cargo of 24,800 tons of granulated coal. The ship
sailed in spite of a fierce (and ultimately record-breaking) storm that
was gathering.

The Marine Electric neared the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay at about 2:00
a.m. on Thursday, February 10. She battled 25-foot (7.6-m) waves and
winds gusting to more than 55 miles per hour (89 km/h), fighting the
storm to reach port with her cargo.

The following day, she was contacted by the United States Coast Guard to
turn back to assist a fishing vessel, the Theodora, that was taking on
water.

The Theodora eventually recovered and proceeded on its
westerly course back to Virginia; the Marine Electric turned north to
resume its original route.

During the course of the investigation into the ship’s sinking,
representatives of MTL theorized that the ship ran aground during her
maneuvering to help the Theodora, fatally damaging th e hull. They
contended that it was this grounding that caused the Marine Electric to
sink five hours later.

But Coast Guard investigations, and independent examinations of the
wreck, told a different story: the Marine Electric left port fatally
un-seaworthy, with gaping holes in its hull, deck plating and hatch
covers. The hatch covers, in particular, posed a problem, since without
them the car go hold could fill with water in the storm and drag the
ship under.

And it was there that the investigation took a
second, dramatic turn.

Investigators discovered that much of the paperwork supporting MTL´s
declarations that the Marine Electric was seaworthy was faked.
Inspection records showed inspections of the hatch covers during periods
where they´d in fact been removed from the ship for ma intenance;
inspections were recorded during periods of time when the ship wasn´t
even in port. A representative of the hatch covers´ manufacturer warned
MTL in 1982 that their condition posed a threat to the ship’s
seaworthiness. But inspectors never tested them. And yet, the Marine
Electric was repeatedly certified as seaworthy.

Part of the problem was that the Coast Guard delegated some of it s
inspection authority to the American Bureau of Shipping.

The ABS
is a private, non-profit agency that developed rules, standards and
guidelines for ship´s hulls. In the wake of the Marine Electric tragedy,
questions were raised about how successfully the ABS was exercising the
inspection authority delegated to it, as well as about whether the
Coast Guard even had the authority to delegate that r ole.

In the wake of the Marine Electric investigation, the Coast Guard
dramatically changed their inspection and oversight procedures. The
Coast Guard report noted that the ABS, in particular, "cannot be
considered impartial", and described their failure to notice the
critical problems with the ship as negligent. At the same time, the
report noted that "the inexperience of the inspectors who we nt aboard
the Marine Electric, and their failure to recognize the safety
hazards...raises doubt about the capabilities of the Coast Guard
inspectors to enforce the laws and regulations in a satisfactory
manner."

While the Coast Guard commandant did not accept all of the
recommendations of the Marine Board report, inspections tightened and
more than 70 old World War II relics still functioning 4 0 years after
the war were sent to scrap yards.

Additionally, the Coast Guard required that survival suits be required
on all winter North Atlantic runs. Later, as a direct result of the
casualties on the Marine Electric, Congress pushed for and the Coast
Guard eventually established the now famous Coast Guard Rescue Swimmer
program.

Though the safety of sailors at sea improved in the wake o f the Marine
Electric tragedy, those improvements in safety came at the expense of 31
lives, condemned to a watery grave by poor maintenance and inadequate
governmental oversight.









From http://www.capt-jt.com/Wreck_Info.htm

The sinking of this wreck in 1983 in a storm caused many new
changes in the inspection and safety of these vessels. When I first dived the
wreck I was amazed by the size of it and that was only the stern. The midbody
and bow are broken off and sit at different locations than the stern. Many
artifacts can be found here as well as fish and lobsters. The wreck is a great
dive. Only those with years of diving and training should attempt to go inside
this wreck. I once tried a massive study of the inside on a solo dive and had to
call the dive due to stress. I will go back and try this again in a team effort
to do the study of the inside.




T-E Bulk carrier
605 X 75 X 47